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INTRODUCTION 
In Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01 (IB 2015-01),1 the U.S. 
Department of Labor (DOL) renewed the now two-decades old battle 
over “economically targeted investments” (ETIs). As a matter of 
statutory interpretation, IB 2015-01, like its predecessors, is 
unpersuasive. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
 
 †  Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 
Yeshiva University. 
 1 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2015). 
C A R D O Z O  L A W  R E V I E W  
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(ERISA)2 requires plan trustees to invest “solely” to provide 
participants’ retirement benefits. A trustee who invests in ETIs violates 
this statutory obligation by pursuing collateral economic benefits for 
persons other than plan participants. 
As a matter of policy, the social investing which ETIs exemplify is 
unsound. At best, such social investing in practice merely shuffles 
investment ownership without altering market-based allocations of 
capital. 
I.     STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
Among its many innovations, ERISA codified the traditional 
fiduciary standards for the investment of the assets of federally 
regulated3 employee benefit plans.4 
Historically, the trustees of private trust funds have been required 
to invest such funds prudently,5 diversely,6 and loyally.7 While the 
grantor of a private trust can modify these standards,8 prudence, 
diversification, and loyalty are the default standards for fiduciaries 
investing private trust funds.9 The standard of loyalty demands of the 
trustee a single-minded concern for the beneficiary. This standard of 
loyalty is typically expressed in terms of a sole or exclusive benefit, i.e., 
trustees are “to administer the trust solely in the interest of the 
 
 2 ERISA was originally passed as P.L. 93-406. See Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). It has subsequently been amended many 
times. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01. Parts of ERISA are codified in the Internal Revenue Code, 
which is Title 26 of the U.S. Code. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401–409 (2012). Other parts of ERISA are 
codified in Title 29 of the U.S. Code. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012). 
 3 Some employee benefit plans are not covered by ERISA. For example, ERISA does not 
apply to state and local governments’ plans for their employees. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2012). 
However, many states, by statute or in their respective constitutions, impose the duties of 
prudence and loyalty upon the trustees of governmental pension plans. To take one case, 
California’s constitution provides that “[t]he assets of a public pension or retirement system are 
trust funds and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the 
pension or retirement system and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of 
administering the system.” CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17. 
 4 Under ERISA, employee benefit plans include both employer-provided retirement plans, 
such as defined benefit pensions and 401(k) arrangements and employer-sponsored fringe benefit 
plans, such as medical and death benefit arrangements. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)–(2) (2012) 
(defining “welfare plan[s]” and “pension plan[s]); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2012) (defining 
“employee benefit plan[s]” as both welfare and pension plans). 
 5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TR. § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 6 Id. § 90(b). 
 7 Id. at §§ 78, 90(c)(1). 
 8 Id. §§ 78(1), 90(d), 91. 
 9 Id. § 76 cmt. b(1) (“[T]he normal standards of trustee conduct prescribed by trust fiduciary 
law may, at least to some extent, be modified by the terms of the trust. Briefly stated, much of 
trust law, especially trust fiduciary law, is default law—but some is not.”); § 91 cmt. a (“[M]ost—
but not all—trust fiduciary law is default law and therefore not applicable to the extent 
permissibly modified by trust terms.”). 
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beneficiaries.”10 
ERISA incorporated these traditional fiduciary standards and 
applied them to the trustees holding the assets of employee benefit 
plans.11 ERISA adopted the fiduciary duty of loyalty by decreeing that 
an employee benefit plan fiduciary must “discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to 
participants and their beneficiaries.”12 
ERISA similarly incorporated the standard of prudence by 
obligating employee benefit trustees to act “with the care, . . . prudence, 
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent 
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use 
in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”13  
A.     Background: Social Investing 
The cause of social investing travels under many banners including 
ethical investing, socially responsible investing, impact investing and 
socially conscious investing.14 Regardless of the particular label, all of 
these approaches postulate that investments should be made, not simply 
on the basis of anticipated risk and return, but to pursue other criteria as 
well. The proponents of social investing contend that, even as investors 
seek collateral benefits beyond conventional financial returns, social 
investing does not diminish profitability or increase risk for the 
investor.15 
Calvert Investments typifies this approach, which Calvert calls 
“responsible investing.”16 Responsible investing, Calvert asserts, 
achieves “competitive investment returns” for the assets invested in 
 
 10 Id. § 78(1). 
 11 See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 85 (1995) 
(“ERISA . . . follows standard trust law principles . . . .”); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 
473 U.S. 134, 151 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The legislative history demonstrates that 
Congress intended by § 404(a) to incorporate the fiduciary standards of trust law into 
ERISA. . . .”). 
 12 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012). Before the enactment of ERISA, this standard 
appeared in § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code where it still appears today. Internal Revenue 
Code Section § 401 declares that qualified pension and profit sharing plans must be “for the 
exclusive benefit of” the employees of the sponsoring employer and such employees’ 
beneficiaries. See I.R.C. § 401(a). 
 13 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 14 Paul Sullivan, Jon Bon Jovi, the Jersey Shore and the Impact Investing Strategy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2015, at B4; AUGUSTIN LANDIER & VINAY B. NAIR, INVESTING FOR CHANGE: 
PROFIT FROM RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT x (2009). 
 15 See, e.g., LANDIER & NAIR, supra note 14, at 68 (Social investing can be used to “construct 
a portfolio that expresses strong responsibility preferences without giving up returns or 
significantly raising risk.”). 
 16 CALVERT INVESTMENTS, www.calvert.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
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Calvert’s funds.17 In general terms, Calvert channels its clients’ 
investments to companies which are environmentally sensitive, “respect 
human rights,” and are governed accountably and transparently.18 
Among the specific rules implementing these principles, Calvert will 
not sponsor investments in companies involved with tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling, or firearms.19 
TIAA (formerly TIAA-CREF) has also climbed onto the 
responsible investing bandwagon, maintaining both bond and equity 
funds designed to achieve “direct environmental and social benefits.”20 
Such funds, TIAA assures its customers, “deliver[] competitive 
performance . . . . over the long term.”21 
In another variant, Timothy Plan funds promote “biblically 
responsible investing.”22 For example, Timothy Plan has identified “77 
companies that have given corporate donations or sponsored events for 
Planned Parenthood within the past five years.”23 Timothy Plan’s 
mutual funds avoid investments in these firms. 
B.     Administrative Background 
The DOL issued Interpretive Bulletin 94-1 (IB 94-1) during the 
Clinton Administration. IB 94-1 encouraged employee benefit trusts to 
make social investments designated as ETIs. Per IB 94-1, ETIs are 
investments of employee benefit plan assets “selected for the economic 
benefits they create apart from their investment return to the employee 
benefit plan.”24 IB 94-1 opined that, if an ETI is prudent, ERISA’s duty 
of loyalty permits an employee plan trustee to select such investment for 
its economic benefits to third parties.25 
 
 17 Our Philosophy, CALVERT INVESTMENTS, www.calvert.com/approach/overview/our-
philosophy (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
 18 The Calvert Principles for Responsible Investment, CALVERT INVESTMENTS, 
www.calvert.com/approach/how-we-invest/the-calvert-principles (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
 19 Id. 
 20 The Road to Wealth Can Be Paved With Good Intentions, TIAA GLOBAL ASSET 
MANAGEMENT, https://www.tiaa.org/public/assetmanagement/land/responsible-investing (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Timothy Plan: Investing with Biblical Principles, TIMOTHY PLAN, http://timothyplan.com/
download/Brochure.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 23 Companies Directly Supporting Planned Parenthood, EVALUEATOR, http://
evalueator.com/download/Companies_Funding_Planned_Parenthood-LD.pdf (last updated Dec. 
9, 2015). 
 24 29 C.F.R § 2509.94-1 (2006) (superseded by 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2012)). 
 25 See id.; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments: A Critical 
Analysis, 6 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 39 (1997) (hereinafter Kansas); Edward A. Zelinsky, 
ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted Investments, IB 94-1 and the 
Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 333, 335 (1995) (hereinafter 
Berkeley). 
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Subsequently, in the waning days of the second Bush 
Administration, the DOL replaced IB 94-1 with Interpretive Bulletin 
08-1 (IB 08-1).26 While IB 94-1 was a robust endorsement of ETIs, IB 
08-01 placed a damper on ETIs, declaring that employee plan 
fiduciaries may consider collateral economic benefits only “in very 
limited circumstances.”27 According to IB 08-01, employee benefit 
trustees may consider collateral economic benefits only to break ties 
when such trustees must choose among otherwise comparable 
investments.28 
Just as IB 08-1 superseded IB 94-1, IB 2015-01 now replaces IB 
08-01. The DOL’s stated intent in promulgating IB 2015-01 is to 
reinstate the more robust support for ETIs previously embodied in IB 
94-1.29 IB 2015-01 characterizes the duty of loyalty “as prohibiting a 
fiduciary from subordinating the interests of participants and 
beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives.”30 The 
standard of prudence, IB-2015-01 states, is not satisfied if an employee 
benefit plan trustee invests plan assets in an investment “with a lower 
expected rate of return than available alternative investments with 
commensurate degrees of risk or is riskier than alternative available 
investments with commensurate rates of return.”31 If these 
“requirements are met,” IB 2015-01 concludes that “the selection of an 
ETI, or the engaging in an investment course of action intended to result 
in the selection of ETIs” complies with ERISA’s standards of prudence 
and loyalty.32 
II.     EVALUATING IB 2015-01 
A.     ETIs Violate the Statutory Standard of Prudence: “Solely” Means 
Solely 
At one level, the difference among IB 94-1, IB 08-01 and IB 2015-
 
 26 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2012) (superseded by 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2015)). 
 27 Id.; Edward A. Zelinsky, Interpretive Bulletin 08-1 and Economically Targeted Investing: 
A Missed Opportunity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 11, 14 (2009), reprinted in NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1A-5 (Alvin D. 
Lurie ed., 2009). 
 28 See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1. 
 29 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering 
Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,135, 65,136 (Oct. 26, 2015) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01) (“IB 2008-01 has unduly discouraged fiduciaries from considering 
ETIs and ESG factors.”). ESG refers to “environmental, social and governance” matters. Id. at 
65,135.  
 30 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2015). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
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01 is rhetorical: IB 94-1 and IB-2015-01 encourage employee benefit 
plan trustees to make ETIs. IB 08-01 is more subdued, acknowledging 
that such investments can be made only “in very limited 
circumstances.” Rhetoric matters, which is why the Bush DOL sought 
to dampen enthusiasm for ETIs through IB 08-01 and the Obama 
Administration now seeks to encourage ETIs through IB 2015-01. 
All three interpretive bulletins are wrong to condone the pursuit of 
collateral economic benefits with employee benefit plan funds. The 
pursuit of ETIs contradicts ERISA’s statutory text which commands 
that plan fiduciaries “solely”33 and “exclusive[ly]”34 concern themselves 
with the provision of participants’ retirement and welfare benefits. 
This uncompromising statutory terminology incorporates the 
traditional standard of fiduciary loyalty. That standard demands of 
trustees single-minded concern for the interests of the trust 
beneficiaries. When a trustee pursues collateral economic benefits for 
third parties through an ETI, the trustee violates the statute’s 
unforgiving mandate as the trustee no longer acts “solely” or 
“exclusive[ly]” for the participants’ welfare. 
Thus, IB 2015-01, like its two predecessors, flouts ERISA’s 
statutory text. IB 2015-01 replaces ERISA’s strong statutory standard of 
loyalty (“solely” and “exclusive”) with a weaker rule of 
nonsubordination. According to IB 2015-01, pension trustees may 
pursue third parties’ interests as long as such collateral interests do not 
subordinate the pursuit of risk-adjusted returns earned for plan 
participants. 
For good reason, the standard of loyalty, incorporated into ERISA, 
is not articulated in these or in similarly attenuated terms. Trustees, as 
the old saying goes, invest other people’s money.35 Beneficiaries often 
lack the ability to monitor trustees’ actions on the beneficiaries’ 
behalf.36 To protect these beneficiaries, the legal standard of loyalty 
permits no considerations in trustees’ decisionmaking other than the 
interests of the beneficiaries. In contrast, IB 2015-01, like its 
predecessors, opens trustees’ decisionmaking to the interests of third 
parties and to the pursuit of collateral goals other than the financing of 
employees’ retirement and welfare benefits. 
In setting aside the single-minded statutory duty of loyalty, IB 
2015-01 implicitly propounds a naive theory of decisionmaking. IB 
 
 33 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 34 Id.  
 35 This venerable phrase traces its origins back to Adam Smith and Louis D. Brandeis. See 3 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 334 
(Edinburgh, A. and C. Black; London, Longman, Brown, Green, & Longmans 1850); LOUIS 
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT (1914).  
 36 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
657–58 (1995).  
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2015-01 assumes that plan trustees’ investment decisions involve a two-
step process in which the two steps are hermetically sealed from each 
other. In the first step, trustees identify the universe of prudent 
investments “giv[ing] appropriate consideration” to “such factors as 
diversification, liquidity, and risk/return characteristics.”37 Then, in the 
second stage, trustees can select from among these equally prudent 
investments by choosing ETIs for the collateral economic benefits they 
generate for third parties.38 Under this vision, the collateral benefits of 
ETIs serve as “tie-breakers when choosing between investment 
alternatives that are otherwise equal . . . .”39 
The traditional formulation of the standard of loyalty is more 
psychologically compelling by insisting that a trustee concern herself 
“solely” with the beneficiaries’ welfare throughout the fiduciary 
decisionmaking process. A trustee seeking to make an ETI will be 
tempted (perhaps unconsciously, perhaps deliberately) to classify that 
investment as part of the eligible universe identified in the first step of 
her decisionmaking. To counteract such temptations, the standard of 
loyalty, as traditionally articulated and as incorporated into ERISA, 
mandates single-minded concern for the beneficiary’s welfare 
throughout the trustees’ decisionmaking process: Trustees must pursue 
beneficiaries’ interests “solely” and “exclusively.” Anything less opens 
the door of the fiduciary decisionmaking process to influences which 
are potentially detrimental to the beneficiaries’ welfare. 
Much modern research under the rubric of behavioral economics 
reinforces the historic formulation of the standard of prudence as now 
incorporated in ERISA. Even professional decisionmakers can be 
influenced by the way in which issues are framed.40 Choices can be 
“nudged” by the manner in which such choices are presented.41 A 
trustee who knows that, in a second stage of decisionmaking, he may 
select an ETI for its collateral economic benefits may be more inclined 
in the first stage to classify the desired investment as part of the 
available universe. The standard of IB 2015-01—do not subordinate the 
pursuit of risk adjusted returns for collateral economic benefits—is 
notably weaker than the rule commanded by the stronger standard of 
loyalty—consider the participants’ welfare exclusively. 
Thus, collateral economic benefit is not an innocent tie-breaking 
 
 37 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2015). 
 38 Id.  
 39 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering 
Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. at 65,136.  
 40 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer 
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. 
TAX REV. 797 (2005).  
 41 See RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 1–4 (2008). 
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device. Rather, it introduces into the fiduciary decisionmaking process 
extraneous considerations best left aside. 
What should the prudent trustee do when genuinely confronted 
with a choice from among economically identical investments? Better to 
flip a coin, since coin flipping (unlike the pursuit of collateral economic 
benefits or any other social investing goal) does not introduce into the 
decisionmaking process considerations which, unconsciously or 
deliberately, can skew that process. Consider, for example, a pension 
trustee whose personal religious views correspond to those of the 
Timothy Fund. When deploying his own money, that trustee is free to 
make only “biblically responsible investments.” He is then investing his 
own funds. 
However, the pension assets this trustee controls are other people’s 
money, assets financing participants’ benefits. Some of those 
participants may disagree with the values animating the Timothy Fund. 
Even if every participant in the plan embraces those values, if those 
values can be considered at the second stage of the investment process, 
those values may (unconsciously or deliberately) influence the choices 
made at the first stage of the process. 
The import of the traditional rule of prudence is that, once some 
collateral considerations start to influence the investment of trust funds, 
regardless of how worthy those considerations might be, it is not easy to 
shut the door to other extraneous concerns. Not all of these 
considerations will be admirable or compatible with the beneficiary’s 
welfare. Hence, ERISA (reflecting traditional fiduciary standards) 
requires that employee benefit trust funds be invested single-mindedly, 
solely, and exclusively to fund employees’ retirement and welfare 
benefits. 
In short, “solely” means solely. 
Consider in this context an employee benefit plan with two 
trustees, one of whom is strongly pro-choice and, therefore, seeks the 
collateral benefit of supporting corporations which are equally firm in 
their support of the right of abortion. The other trustee is pro-life and 
consequently opposes investment in any corporation which 
manufactures products used in the abortion procedure. Which of these 
contrasting collateral benefits is this plan to pursue? 
The traditional rule of loyalty as incorporated into ERISA wisely 
protects plan assets from becoming political battlegrounds in these and 
other similar settings. These two trustees may invest their personal 
assets however they choose. However, in their capacities as the trustees 
of ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans, these trustees must put 
their personal concerns aside and must act “solely” for the participants’ 
welfare. By attenuating this high fiduciary standard, IB 2015-01 ignores 
the statutory text of ERISA and improperly opens trustees’ 
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decisionmaking to collateral interests and influences. 
Instructive in this context is the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer.42 Writing for a unanimous court, 
Justice Breyer expounded on ERISA’s statutory standard that plan 
trustees must act exclusively in the interests of plan participants and 
their beneficiaries.43 That steadfast standard of loyalty, Justice Breyer 
wrote, mandates that plan trustees focus upon “financial benefits (such 
as retirement income)”44 for participants rather than pursue 
“nonpecuniary benefits like those supposed to arise from employee 
ownership of employer stock.”45 If ERISA’s statutory duty of loyalty 
precludes a plan trustee from searching for “nonpecuniary benefits” for 
plan participants, a fortiori that statutory duty prohibits a plan trustee 
from seeking collateral benefits for third parties—which is precisely 
what economically targeted investing entails. 
B.     Social Investing is Musical Chairs 
As a matter of policy, the kind of social investing which ETIs 
exemplify is unsound. At best, such social investing in practice merely 
shuffles investment ownership without altering market-based 
allocations of capital. 
The advocates of social investing uniformly claim that those 
investing in this fashion achieve the risk adjusted rates of return which 
prevail in the marketplace.46 If so, these social investors are not 
changing economic outcomes. If a social investor eschews a particular 
investment yielding a market-rate return, another investor will make 
that investment. This is what it means for an investment to yield a 
market-rate return, i.e., someone in the market will undertake that 
investment. 
If a Calvert fund sells the stock of a corporation which yields 
market-rate returns but fails Calvert’s environmental criteria, or if a 
Timothy Plan fund sells the stock of a corporation which generates 
market-rate returns but manufactures products used in abortions, 
someone without their respective qualms will buy the stock from them. 
The net result is a game of musical chairs which simply shuffles share 
ownership with no net economic impact. 
Similarly, if, responding to IB 2015-01, a pension trustee makes a 
market-rate investment to pursue collateral economic benefits, the 
 
 42 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014). 
 43 Id. at 2467–70. 
 44 Id. at 2468. 
 45 Id. 
 46 LANDIER & NAIR, supra note 14, at 66–69. 
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market’s allocation of capital is not thereby affected. If this investment 
truly yields a market-rate return, someone else (unconcerned about 
ETIs) will make this investment. In a reasonably well-functioning 
market, the market will allocate capital to investments generating a risk-
adjusted market-rate return. 
And this assumes that in practice social investing indeed achieves 
market-rate returns rather than sacrifices financial returns to pursue 
other goals. 
Social investing is acceptable when one is investing one’s own 
funds. An individual can deploy her own money at below market rates 
rather than hold investments which contravene her beliefs. But there 
should be no illusion about the economic results of investing at market 
rates. If markets are functioning reasonably well, the social investor is 
merely switching places with an investor without her qualms. 
CONCLUSION 
Both as a matter of statutory law and as a matter of policy, the 
ETIs encouraged by IB 2015-01 are unsound. Statutorily, a trustee of an 
employee benefit plan who invests to generate economic benefits for 
third parties violates his ERISA obligation to invest solely and 
exclusively for the welfare of the plan’s beneficiaries. At best, the kind 
of social investing exemplified by ETIs in practice merely shuffles 
investment ownership without altering market-based allocations of 
capital. 
Congress acted wisely when, in ERISA, it applied the traditional 
duty of loyalty to trustees’ investments of employee benefit plan assets. 
Such assets should, as ERISA provides, be invested solely and 
exclusively to promote employees’ financial interests. IB 2015-01, like 
its administrative predecessors, improperly dilutes this high fiduciary 
standard. 
